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Hendricks: The Flight From Judgment

THE FLIGHT FROM JUDGMENT:
REFLECTIONS ON BENJAMIN BARTON’S AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE PRE-APPOINTMENT
EXPERIENCE
Jennifer Hendricks ∗
In their book, Practical Wisdom: The Right Way to Do the Right
Thing, Barry Schwartz and Kenneth Sharpe highlight the task of
sentencing a convicted criminal as quintessentially calling for practical
wisdom. 1 Wisdom, they argue, is not a transcendent state to be achieved
by mystical means but a skill that must be learned and improved by
practice, trial, and error. 2 It is grounded in empathy, which is the
cognitive ability “to imagine what someone else is thinking and
feeling.” 3 A person’s capacity for wisdom can be stunted by rote
adherence to inflexible rules or by carrots and sticks that replace good
character with a reward system.
Professor Benjamin Barton’s new Article argues that the rarified and
insular biographies of the current justices of the Supreme Court are illsuited for developing practical wisdom. 4 Having jumped through every
hoop and won every gold star the legal profession has to offer, the
current Court is “uniquely elite and cloistered,” 5 sorely lacking in
courtroom experience, and too prone to manufacture legal complexity in
the name of technical excellence. 6 While Professor Barton’s focus is on
a thorough and revealing empirical analysis of the current Supreme
Court as compared to its predecessors, he makes a strong normative
case that the elitist shift is harmful to the Court’s work. 7 This essay
offers one example of a case in which some justices exercised but others
rejected a jurisprudential approach grounded in practical wisdom. It
concludes with thoughts connecting our criteria for selecting judges
with our nation’s educational goals.
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro 8 is the Supreme Court’s
most recent failure to reach consensus on the law of personal
jurisdiction. The opinions in that case reveal a divide on the Court over
whether judges can be trusted to exercise judgment.
∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. B.A., 1993,
Swarthmore College; J.D., 1998, Harvard Law School.
1. BARRY SCHWARTZ & KENNETH SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM: THE RIGHT WAY TO DO
THE RIGHT THING (2010).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 23.
4. Benjamin H. Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice Pre-Appointment
Exerperience, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2012).
5. Id. at 1171.
6. Id. at 1172–73.
7. Id.at 1138–39.
8. 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011).
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In McIntyre, the Court ruled 6–3 against personal jurisdiction in
New Jersey over McIntyre Machinery, a British manufacturer. 9 Justice
Kennedy wrote the plurality opinion for himself, the Chief Justice, and
Justices Scalia and Thomas. 10 Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment
and wrote a separate opinion, joined by Justice Alito. 11 Justice Ginsburg
wrote a dissent for herself and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. 12
Justice Kennedy’s plurality sought to dethrone International Shoe13
as the foundation of modern personal jurisdiction doctrine; the opinion
declared its allegiance to the sovereignty-based theory of jurisdiction
that undergirded Pennoyer v. Neff. 14 This plurality dismissed the Shoe
approach as based on “[f]reeform notions of fundamental fairness.” 15
Although written by Justice Kennedy, the opinion bore the marks of
Justice Scalia’s commitment to “the rule of law as a law of rules” and
his hostility to entrusting constitutional judgments to the wisdom of
federal judges. 16
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent engaged the practical reality of
international commerce, in which foreign manufacturers are likely to
treat the United States as a single market, without particular regard for
the borders of individual states. 17 Her approach recognized that practical
judgment calls were an integral part of the jurisdictional analysis. In
contrast, Justice Breyer appeared to share some of Justice Ginsburg’s
concerns but voted to find no jurisdiction in McIntyre because of
slippery slope concerns: If there is jurisdiction over McIntyre, Justice
Breyer argued, what about “an Appalachian potter, . . . a small Egyptian
shirt maker, a Brazilian manufacturing cooperative, or a Kenyan coffee
farmer,” each of which sells its products to distant customers through a
distributor? 18 What if, in other words, lower court judges are unable to
9. Id. at 2791.
10. Id. at 2785.
11. Id.
12. Id. McIntyre is one of two cases so far in which the Supreme Court has split 6-3 along
gender lines. The other case was Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S.Ct. 2044 (2012), which triggered a
minor buzz in the blogosphere over whether the split indicated that the female justices were
more empathetic toward the criminal defendant in that case. See Mark Tushnet, The
(Ir)relevance of Gender to Judicial Decisions?, BALKINIZATION (May 24, 2012, 10:49 AM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/05/irrelevance-of-gender-to-judicial.html; Ann Althouse, The
Supreme Court’s new double-jeopardy case divided 6-3 on gender lines: was this “some sort of
(May
25,
2012,
6:03
PM),
gender-related
‘empathy’”?,
ALTHOUSE
http://althouse.blogspot.com/2012/05/supreme-courts-new-double-jeopardy-case.html.
13. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
14. 95 U.S. 714 (1877); McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787–89.
15. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2787.
16. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176–77
(1989).
17. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794–95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
18. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2793–94 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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exercise reasoned judgment in making jurisdictional decisions?
Joining in Justice Ginsburg’s McIntyre dissent was Justice
Sotomayor, whose nomination in 2009 had touched off controversy
over whether practical wisdom is part of the job description for a
Supreme Court justice. The national conversation about her began with
empathy-gate. 19 In his nominating speech, President Obama praised
Justice Sotomayor for bringing empathy to the task of judging. 20 Critics
portrayed empathy as the antithesis of objective reasoning, accusing the
president of believing that “judging should be shaped by ‘empathy’ as
much or more than by reason.” 21 But empathy is not the opposite of
reason. As Schwartz and Sharpe explain, “empathy—the capacity to
imagine what someone else is thinking and feeling—is critical for the
perception that practical wisdom demands.” 22 Rather than interfering
with reasoned judgment, empathy makes emotion “an ally of reason.” 23
Also controversial was Justice Sotomayor’s comment about making
decisions as “a wise Latina.” 24 This statement implies that wisdom is
linked to a person’s life experiences, but it was widely construed as
indicating bias, in contrast to Chief Justice Roberts’s pledge to judge
like a baseball umpire, just calling the balls and strikes. 25
The “ball and strikes” theory of judging rejects the proposition that
we should hope for wisdom from our judges, preferring instead to
choose the “most qualified” judges, where most qualified means having
won the most gold stars in a meritocratic system that increasingly

19. Marcus Alexander Gadson, Empathy-gate, BLOGCRITICS (May 31, 2009, 8:42 PM),
http://blogcritics.org/politics/article/empathy-gate/.
20. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Nominating Judge Sonia
Sotomayer to the United States Supreme Court (May 26, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/remarks-president-nominating-judge-sonia-sotomayor-united-states-supreme-court.
21. The “Empathy” Nominee, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2009, at A18.
22. See SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, surpa note 1, at 23.
23. Id. at 26.
24. See Sotomayer’s “Wise Latina” Comment a Staple of Her Speeches, CNN (June 5,
2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-06-05/politics/sotomayor.speeches_1_sotomayor-sconfirmation-sotomayor-supporters-judge-sonia-sotomayor?_s=PM:POLITICS.
25. See Roberts: “My job is to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat”, CNN (Sept.
12, 2005), http://articles.cnn.com/2005-09-12/politics/roberts.statement_1_judicial-role-judgesjudicial-oath?_s=PM:POLITICS. Some sports fans and law bloggers argued that an umpire’s
job, like a judge’s, requires more nuanced and contextual judgments than the Chief Justice’s
analogy implied. See, e.g., Howard Wasserman, Pine Tar: Of Baseball and Law, PRAWFSBLAWG
(JULY 24, 2011, 10:31 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/07/pine-tar-anolder-of-baseball-and-law.html (“Umpiring—it’s a lot more than calling balls and strikes.”)
Reaction to the recent NFL replacement referee fiasco, however, suggests that the public sees
sports refereeing as a matter of correctly observing and reporting upon objective truth, rather
than balancing numerous subtle factors. See, e.g., Replacement Ref Furor Grows, ESPN (Sept.
25, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/8422572/replacement-ref-furor-growsseattle-seahawks-wild-win-green-bay-packers.
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defines merit according to outcomes quantified and boxes checked. 26 As
Professor Barton points out, there is a mismatch between the skills and
talents rewarded by the legal meritocracy and those that are most
needed in judges. 27 Like much recent discussion of legal education, the
meritocratic defense of the current Court confuses law school with the
practice of law. Getting top grades in law school indicates proficiency—
even brilliance—at a subset of the huge range of tasks involved in
lawyering: the tasks that call for analytic ability and skillful use of the
English language in formal settings. With the growth of clinical
education, we can add to the list the capacity to engage in critical selfreflection while engaged in a professional practice. The development of
the practical wisdom of lawyering can be begun in law school but must
be learned through practice over the longer term. There is little reason to
believe that top grades at a top school—and the cascade of advancement
precipitated by that achievement—necessarily predicts the development
of those other skills.
None of this means that we should not want our judges to be very
smart or very well educated. I have suggested through the McIntyre
example that Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor both exercise practical
wisdom and embrace it as a guiding principle of judging; it seems that
each justice’s capacity for empathy survived her elite education. On the
other hand, to return to picking on Justice Breyer: He is, to be sure, a
brilliant lawyer in many respects. But his empathetic skills have been
open to question at least since the oral argument in Safford Unified
School District #1 v. Redding, 28 in which he questioned whether stripsearching a 13-year-old girl in the principal’s office was meaningfully
different from requiring her to change clothes for gym class. 29 One of
his principal achievements before joining the Supreme Court was as a
chief architect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which sought to
replace the practical wisdom of federal judges with formulas for
culpability and remorse. 30 And his McIntyre opinion, in the mundane
26. Cf. Vi Hart, Doodling in Math Class: Connecting Dots, YOUTUBE
http://www.youtube.com/user/vihart (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (“[Educators have] come to
understand that education is about money and prestige and not about becoming a better human
able to do great things . . . Algebra has become a checkbox subject, and mathematics weeps
alone in the top of the ivory tower prison to which she has been condemned.”).
27. Barton, supra note 4, at 1187.
28. 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
29. Oral Argument at 43:40, Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 367
(2009) No. 08-479, available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/20002009/2008/2008_08_479#argument.
30. See Linda Greenhouse, Guidelines on Sentencing Are Flawed, Justice Says,
N.Y.Times, Nov. 21, 1998, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/21/us/guidelines-onsentencing-are-flawed-justice-says.html. The wise judge, Lois Forer, profiled by Schwartz and
Sharpe eventually resigned, in part out of frustration with such clumsy, rule-bound restraints on
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context of a case about personal jurisdiction over a foreign
manufacturer, betrays the lack of confidence in practical wisdom that
Professor Barton predicts is likely to result from the narrow range of
experience that too often precedes an appointment to today’s Supreme
Court.
Two lessons, then, from Professor Barton’s data and the supporting
anecdote presented here: First, as with the Sotomayor nomination,
presidents picking judges need to actively seek out not only brilliance
but also wisdom, empathy, and diverse experiences. Second,
educational institutions must ensure that there are enough such
candidates to choose from by cultivating not only analytical skill but
also the capacities for empathetic reasoning, risk-taking, and learning
from experience.

her judgment. See SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, surpa note 1, at 115.
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